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Abstract
Federal transfers can depend on local fiscal capacity which is measured
by local tax bases. The aim of this paper is to understand to what extent
and how these transfers aﬀect local tax decisions. We develop a model with
two provinces producing one mobile good. The good is taxed according to
the destination principle. Final consumers decide to buy the good from
the province where it is cheaper. The two provinces engage in tax compe-
tition. The introduction of scale economies into the shopping technology
generates nonlinear tax reaction functions which make it possible to test
the eﬀect of a transfer equalizing local tax bases on tax competition in
two complementary tax regimes. Used for this purpose are cigarette and
gasoline tax data from Canada. In the case of cigarette tax it is found that
nonlinearity in tax competition is almost entirely oﬀset when equalization
holds: tax competition in the two tax regimes become closer. The shop-
ping technology for gasoline gives less scope for scale economies, so that
equalization does not aﬀect reaction functions.
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rate.
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1 Introduction
In federal countries, such as Canada or the USA, indirect taxes are often au-
tonomously decided by each province or state, and people are able to cross borders
freely and buy goods at the better price.
In this situation each state typically fixes its tax rate without taking account
of the benefits in revenue and/or social welfare accruing from its tax-base mi-
gration to the other state (Mintz and Tulkens 1986; Kanbur and Keen 1993).
As a consequence the equilibrium tax rate tends to be ineﬃciently low or high
(Wooders et al., 2002).
Transfers are usually needed to mitigate these ineﬃciencies by compensating
for the loss in revenue due to mobility. Are such transfers important from a
practical point of view? Do they aﬀect local states’ fiscal policies?
This is a key issue within the European Union, where mobility relates to the
elimination of fiscal borders and the implementation of the origin VAT system.
Approval of a clearing compensation mechanism (Commission, 1985) would en-
sure that each nation obtains the same revenue as in a destination system. It
therefore should eliminate the incentive for each nation to use its taxes strategi-
cally.
To address these important issues we study an interesting empirical situa-
tion represented by the Canadian equalizing transfer system. This paper tests
the responsiveness - through local tax decisions - of Canadian provinces to the
equalizing transfer coming from the federal government. Given 33 tax bases, the
transfer is computed by summing up the diﬀerence between a province’s tax base
and a standard tax base, using a standard equalization rate for this purpose. If
the sum is positive no transfer is awarded; if it is negative, the corresponding
equalization transfer is made. In the former case we have a world without trans-
fers, in the latter a world with transfers. When tax bases are mobile this transfer
works exactly as a compensating mechanism for the lost tax base.
According to our theoretical model, the reason for tax-base mobility is that
tax diﬀerentials may encourage cross-border shopping from the low-tax to the
high-tax province. Goods in low-tax jurisdictions are transported, stored and
consumed into high tax jurisdictions; moreover; in the case of illegal cross-border
shopping (Thursby and Thursby, 2000) counterfeit stamps are used so that the
goods can be sold. Significant price diﬀerentials between jurisdictions create
incentives for cross-border shopping. As a consequence, a change in tax by one
jurisdiction aﬀects the tax base of the other jurisdiction (horizontal externality)
by inducing it to change its tax. This process generates the reaction function
which relates the own tax rate to the other jurisdiction’s tax rate. We show that
when the reaction functions are not linear because the good is easily storable, the
introduction of an equalization transfer changes their slopes.
The change in the slope of the reaction function is tested by using tax rates
on cigarettes and gasoline in a panel-data study at province level for Canada
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during the period 1984-1994. We find that the cigarette tax reaction function
is nonlinear. In the theory, the nonlinearity comes from scale economies in the
cross-border shopping technology. The equalization transfer aﬀects cigarettes re-
action functions by almost entirely oﬀsetting their nonlinearity. The gasoline tax
reaction function is instead linear (it is not easy to buy gasoline in low tax juris-
dictions and transport and store it in high tax jurisdictions), so that equalization
does not aﬀect its functional form.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the literature. Section
3 develops the theoretical model and Section 4 describes the eﬀect of the transfer
on the reaction function. Section 5 resumes the testable hypotheses and Section
6 presents the empirical analysis. Finally Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
The source of the tax externality between neighboring provinces relates to the
distribution of potential taxpayers between provinces and to the cost of shop-
ping in the other province. Both determinants are reflected by the slope of each
province’s tax reaction. Scharf (1999) introduces a fixed transaction cost of shop-
ping and a storage cost, together with a linear transport cost to the border. This
generates a cross-border shopping cost function concave in the distance from the
border which aﬀects the tax externality and the slope of the provinces’ reaction
function. Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2001) model corporate tax com-
petition with a spatial model à la Hotelling. They assume that each investor
is subject to a linear cost function if she does not invest in her province. In
their case, the change in the slope of the provinces’ reaction function is due to
the investor distribution in each province, which is assumed to be single-peaked.
These nonlinearities are very interesting from an empirical point of view because
their estimation enables the interpretation of the tax link between neighboring
provinces due to tax competition. Brett and Pinkse (1997, 2000) empirically as-
sess this issue using Canadian data frommunicipalities in British Columbia. They
estimate a structural tax base equation, not finding a significant coeﬃcient of the
neighboring taxes; but, they find a significant link between neighboring taxes and
a given municipal tax. Interestingly, they conclude that the relation is not due
to tax competition, but to some other factor like yardstick competition. Another
interesting idea is put forward by Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998), who analyze
the source of the spatial pattern of Belgian municipalities by discriminating be-
tween first order and second order neighbors, depending on whether they have a
border in common. In the former case, these are municipalities with a boundary
in common with a given municipality; in the latter, they are municipalities with
a boundary in common with the first order neighbors. Heyndels and Vuchelen
test yardstick competition for local income tax and local property tax, finding
a significant coeﬃcient for both neighbors, with a value stronger for first order
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than for second order neighbors: municipalities sharing borders with immediate
neighbors exert an influence on tax choices which decreases with geographical
distance.
Various theoretical studies have discussed the eﬀects of equalization on taxes.
With regards to situations without tax base mobility, Smart (1998) uses an op-
timal taxation model to study the eﬀect of the Canadian equalization system,
showing that equalization induces a substitution eﬀect that lowers the eﬀective
marginal cost of public funds. The transfer reduces the taxation burden on local
taxpayers. If the revenue eﬀect is not very high, equalization induces an increase
in the equilibrium tax rate which results in an ineﬃciently high level of taxation.
This idea is also explored in Kothenburgen (2002), who uses a model where a
private good is produced through a production function with capital and labor.
Local taxes on capital finance the provision of the local public good and capital is
mobile. In a symmetric environment, where all provinces have the same popula-
tion and endowments, the Canadian equalization system implements the optimal
choice that would be made by a unitary government. Taxes, which are too low
in a symmetric Nash equilibrium, increase with equalization. The increase in tax
rate reduces the marginal cost of public funds because a lower amount of tax base
is lost due to an increase in tax. If provinces are symmetric in equilibrium there
is no revenue eﬀect because there is no transfer between them, that would induce
the recipient province to reduce its tax. Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) show that
the equalization system - with some “ad hoc” corrections - guarantees the opti-
mal solution even when allowing for asymmetric countries in the productivity of
capital or in the population1.
There are few recent papers on the eﬀects of transfers on tax-reaction func-
tions. Boadway and Hayashi (2001) use Canadian annual data 1963-1996 to test
horizontal and fiscal interactions, where each estimate is for a single province
or an average province. They find that Ontario’s average tax on capital has a
significant impact on Quebec’s, but that the reverse does not hold. Boadway
and Hayashi explain this by the equalization system: Ontario is a non-recipient
province and Quebec is a recipient province. Esteller-Moré, Sollé-Ollé (2002) test
fiscal interactions and the eﬀect of equalization on the average personal income
tax, using a Canadian panel data-set 1982-1996. They find significant horizontal
and vertical tax interactions and a significant eﬀect of equalization on the reaction
function, but they do not give theoretical explanation as to why the introduction
of equalization should exert the particular negative eﬀect on the reaction function
slope.
This paper uses a Canada-US panel data set (1984-1994) and estimates tax
competition for cigarettes and gasoline in Canada using a nonlinear model. It
examines the eﬀects of equalization by checking the change in the nonlinearity of
the reaction function envisaged by the theory. If the tax-reaction function slope
1In the latter case the equalization formula must be corrected by a parameter depending on
the elasticities of supply and demand.
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is constant as in Kanbur and Keen (1993), it is easy to show that it is unaﬀected
by the equalizing transfer, as it happens for gasoline in Canada.
3 The model
Consider a federation with two member provinces with equal populations, nor-
malized to 1 and uniformly distributed. One mobile good is produced by using
one input with a constant returns to scale technology. When the destination prin-
ciple (people pay tax where they consume the good) holds, cross-border shopping
may occur legally or illegally. In the former case the good is legally transported
from the low tax province to the high tax province for own consumption, while
in the latter case it is normally resold. This latter phenomenon is also known as
bootlegging.
Let i = 1, 2 index the two provinces. Both have the same number of residents.
One province is located at [−1, 0] and the other at [0, 1]. Since the residents are
uniformly distributed, the distance of each resident from the border is d ∈ [0, 1].
Define r as the resident’s reservation price, net of the production cost, identical
in both provinces. If r is nonnegative the resident demands one unit of the good;
otherwise she will demand zero. One can imagine that each resident consumes an
identical amount of the produced good. To simplify the analysis, we normalize
the quantity consumed by each resident to 1. The following assumption is useful:
Assumption 1: The cost of cross-border shopping the normalized demanded
quantity for a consumer situated at a distance d from the border is:
φ(d) =
ln(1 + d)
A
. (1)
where A ≥ 1 is a fixed parameter. Note that φ(d) is an increasing and concave
function and at φ(0) = 0. When A → ∞, we have the perfect mobility case; in
fact φ(d) = 0 ∀d. A = 1 implies φ(d) = ln(1+d).Moreover, since 0 ≤ d ≤ 1, then
0 ≤ φ(d) ≤ ln 2A . Assumption 1 accounts for the possibility to store the good and
thereby save on the fixed transaction cost involved in the cross-border shopping
activity2 (Scharf, 1999; Asplund et al., 2005).
We also assume the following:
2The cost of cross-border shopping results from a variable cost of shopping depending on
the distance from the border (transport cost) and a fixed transaction cost for each trip and a
storage cost (Scharf, 1999). Shoppers decide the optimal number of trips necessary to satisfy
their demand by comparing the sum of the transport and transaction cost with the storage
cost: the farther the consumer is from the border, the lower the optimal number of trips and
the greater the amount of the good purchased in every trip. Therefore if the distance from the
border increases, the transport cost increases, the total fixed transaction cost decreases and the
storage cost increases. A concave storage cost ensures concavity of the cross-border shopping
cost over the distance from the border. In a stylized model such as the one presented here,
this reasoning can be summarized as a cost of cross-border shopping concave in the distance
from the border.
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Assumption 2: r < 1A .
The greater A is, the smaller the cross-border shopping cost for a given dis-
tance from the border. Since A measures the advantage the consumer may obtain
from shopping in the border market, given her distance from the border, it seems
reasonable to assume that the upper bound of the customer’s reservation price
(the willingness to pay) for the good sold inside her province depends negatively
on A.
Assumption 2 is necessary and suﬃcient to guarantee in equilibrium positive
reaction functions in the no-equalization case.3
3.1 The consumer decision
Let ti ∈ [0, r] be the specific unit tax on the mobile good, levied by province i.
Assume that t1 > t2. The consumer in province 1 decides where to buy the good
according to her net surplus. If the customer buys in province 1, she pays t1 plus
the production cost. If the customer purchases bootlegged goods from province
2, she pays φ (k) + t2 plus the production cost, where k is the distance from
the border of the consumer in province 1, who is indiﬀerent between shopping
in province 2 or in province 1. Therefore consumer in province 1 will shop from
province 2 until:
r − [φ (k) + t2] = r − t1.
If we use (1):
k = [φ(t1 − t2)]−1 = eA(t1−t2) − 1. (2)
Since consumers in province 1 are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], k is also the
number of residents in province 1, buying goods from province 2, for a given
t1 − t2. Note that the larger t1, the bigger the increase in the number of people
shopping from province 2, for a given increase in t1 ( dkdt1 > 0 and
d2k
dt21
> 0). This
is because the higher t1, the farther from the border the indiﬀerent consumer is,
the lower the increase in cross-border shopping cost (φ(d)00 < 0).4
If t1 ≤ t2, analogously we obtain:
l = eA(t2−t1) − 1, (3)
3The proof is available upon request.
4Fitz Gerald et al.(1995) analyze two case-studies: Germany-Denmark and Ireland-Northern
Ireland. In both cases the greater the distance from the border, the larger the amount of goods
purchased and the fewer the trips made in any given period. Interestingly Asplund et al. (2005)
find a "striking upward sloping relation between the distance from the border and the growth
in sales" in a study on spirits sales across the Sweden-Denmark border. They also argue that
"these products are easily transportable and storable".
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where l is the distance from the border of the consumer in province 2, who is
indiﬀerent between shopping in province 2 or from province 1. l is also the number
of residents in province 2, buying goods from province 1, for a given t1 − t2.
Finally, if t1 > t2:
B1 = 1− k(t1, t2), (4)
and if t1 ≤ t2:
B1 = 1 + l(t1, t2), (5)
where B1 is the tax base faced by province 1, whose population is normalized to
1. We can simplify notation by defining:
n(t1, t2) =
½
−k(t1, t2) if t1 > t2
l(t1, t2) if t1 ≤ t2.
(6)
Substituting (6) in (4) or (5):
B1 = 1 + n(t1, t2), (7)
implying:
B2 = 1− n(t1, t2), (8)
where n is the incoming or outgoing mobile tax-base quota depending on which
tax regime we are dealing with.
3.2 The province problem
We assume that the following transfer holds for province i:
Ti = α (1−Bi) , (9)
where α is the equalization rate, and the standard mobile tax base, equal to 1,
coincides with the average tax base of the federation. We make the following
assumption on the equalization rate:
Assumption 3: α < 1A .
Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are suﬃcient to have positive reaction functions and
to show the existence of tax-rates Nash equilibrium in the equalization case.5
Note that, by (7)-(9), T1 + T2 = α (1−B1) +α (1−B2) = α (−n+ n) = 0.
Both provinces know the resident’s behavior described in the previous sec-
tion and simultaneously choose their respective ti, by maximizing the following
function:
Wi = Biti + Ti − γiti, (10)
5Proof available upon request.
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using (9):
Wi = Biti + α (1−Bi)− γiti, (11)
where Bi is the tax base of province i, given by (7) or (8); 0 ≤ γi ≤ 1 accounts for
the increase in unpopularity after a unit increase in tax6 in province i. Moreover
γ1 6= γ2. This last inequality is useful in that it rules out symmetric equilibria
which would prevent any comparative statics, because the derivative with respect
to ti of the FOC of (10) does not exist in t1 = t2.
4 The reaction function slope
If we put i = 1 in (11) and substitute (7) in (11) we obtain:
W1 = t1(1 + n(t1, t2))− αn(t1, t2)− γ1t1. (12)
The equalizing transfer aﬀects the tax-rate choice by entering into the objective
function. Province 1 receives (or gives) the compensation transfer αn (recall that
n is the mobile tax-base quota from province 1 to province 2) if a quota of its
tax base shifts into (or out of) the other province.
Province 1 chooses t1, which maximizes (12), obtaining the following first
order condition:
dW1
dt1
=
·
(1 + n) + (t1 − α)
dn
dt1
¸
− γ1 = 0 (13)
We totally diﬀerentiate (13), and by using (1), (2) and (6) get the slope of
the tax-rate reaction function if t1 > t2:
dt1
dt2
¯¯¯¯
t1>t2
=
1 +A (t1 − α)
2 +A (t1 − α)
. (14)
We do the same for t1 < t2 and by using (1), (3), (6):
dt1
dt2
¯¯¯¯
t1<t2
=
1−A (t1 − α)
2−A (t1 − α)
. (15)
If Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold, (14) and (15) are both positive. If Assumption
3 does not hold the high tax province could not have the incentive to positively
react to an increase in tax by the other province. An increase in t2 decreases the
migrating tax-base quota, for a given t1, if t1 > t2, or increases it, for a given t1,
if t1 < t2:7 in both cases province 1 increases t1. With more general models this
6This term is endogenously derived in the yardstick competition literature (Besley, Case
1995). Here we do not model yardstick competition but only take into account its eﬀect in a
static context.
7Henceforth we do not deal with the case t1 = t2 because, given that γ1 6= γ2, the tax-rates
Nash equilibrium is asymmetric.
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result could not hold. For example in the standard Zodrow-Mieszkowsky (1986)
model of tax competition, reaction curves may slope up or down.
Note that as the diﬀerence in provincial tax rates grows, the marginal con-
sumer crossing the border resides farther from the border, where costs are less
sensitive to distance at the margin, and therefore the number of individuals choos-
ing to be cross-border shoppers is more sensitive to the tax diﬀerence. It follows
that if, t1 > t2 initially, then a rise in t2 reduces the diﬀerence in provincial taxes
and hence the marginal sensitivity of the number of cross-border shoppers to t1,
thereby providing more of an incentive to raise t1. On the other hand, if t1 < t2
initially, then a rise in t2 increases the diﬀerence in provincial taxes and hence
the marginal sensitivity, thereby providing incentives not to raise t1 as much.
Interestingly, given that t1 > α8, we can establish that when t1 > t2:
dt1
dt2
=
1 +A (t1 − α)
2 +A (t1 − α)
>
1
2
and when t1 < t2:
dt1
dt2
=
1−A (t1 − α)
2−A (t1 − α)
<
1
2
,
that is to say, that the slope of the reaction function when t1 > t2 is steeper than
when t1 < t2.
4.1 The eﬀect of the transfer
An equalizing transfer changes the incentive to raise t1 after an increase in t2.
In fact, if t1 > t2 initially, equalization can oﬀset the eﬀect of the rise in t2 on
the marginal sensitivity of the number of cross-border shoppers to t1. This is
because introducing equalization has the same eﬀect on the provincial revenue as
decreasing the number of cross-border shoppers. It follows that a rise in t2, even
reducing the diﬀerence in provincial taxes, reduces less than before the marginal
sensitivity of the number of cross-border shoppers to t1, thereby decreasing the
incentive to raise t1. On the other hand, if t1 < t2 initially, then a rise in
t2 increases to a lesser extent the marginal sensitivity of the number of cross-
border shoppers, thereby increasing the incentive to raise t1. This operates in
the opposite direction to the process determining the previous diﬀerence in slope,
and therefore decreases it. Hence, the diﬀerence in slopes of the tax-rate reaction
functions of a province receiving the equalization transfer, between the case t1 > t2
and the case t1 < t2, is smaller than the corresponding diﬀerence in the no-
equalization case, namely:"
dt1
dt2
¯¯¯¯
t1>t2
− dt1
dt2
¯¯¯¯
t1<t2
#¯¯¯¯
¯
α>0
<
"
dt1
dt2
¯¯¯¯
t1>t2
− dt1
dt2
¯¯¯¯
t1<t2
#¯¯¯¯
¯
α=0
.
8Otherwise (13) does not hold. In fact when t1 < t2, (1 + n) − γ1 > 0 and in both tax
regimes dndt1 < 0. It follows that if t1 is bigger, namely t1 > t2, t1 > α must also hold.
9
The above relationship (see appendix for the proof) holds if the introduction
of the transfer will not increase the tax rate more than the equalization rate.
That is to say, dt1dα < 1, which, given Assumption 1, is guaranteed by reasonable
Assumptions on the reservation price and equalization rate (Assumption 2 and
3), ensuring the existence of Nash equilibrium tax rates.9
5 Testable hypotheses
We test the following hypotheses:
H1. dt1dt2 > 0
H2. dt1dt2
¯¯¯
t1>t2
− dt1dt2
¯¯¯
t1<t2
> 0 ∀α
£
0, 1A
£
H3.
·
dt1
dt2
¯¯¯
t1>t2
− dt1dt2
¯¯¯
t1<t2
¸¯¯¯¯
α>0
>
·
dt1
dt2
¯¯¯
t1>t2
− dt1dt2
¯¯¯
t1<t2
¸¯¯¯¯
α=0
Assumption 1 on the shape of the bootlegging cost function is of course in-
directly tested by verifying its eﬀect on the reaction function slope (Hypothesis
2).10 The test on H2 makes sense if Hypothesis 1 is verified. Thereafter, we test
whether the diﬀerence in slopes is aﬀected by the existence of the equalization
transfer (Hypothesis 3).
6 The empirical test
We estimate the tax-reaction function for cigarette and gasoline relating one
provinces’ tax to its neighbor’s tax in two diﬀerent situations: a province in a
federation with a transfer mechanism like the one outlined in the previous section;
a province with no transfer mechanism. We find both situations in Canada, where
there is an equalization system but not all provinces get it.
The Canadian equalization transfer is computed by using 33 tax bases. Equal-
ization entitlements are computed for each of the 33 separate revenue categories.
A jurisdictions’s per-capita entitlement in a revenue category is equal to its per-
capita tax-base deficiency in the category relative to a standard multiplied by
the national average tax-rate for the category.11 Equalization entitlements are
summed over all revenue categories: jurisdictions with a positive total entitle-
ment receive a transfer of that amount from the federal government, whereas
9The proof on the existence of the equilibrium is available upon request.
10As far as we know, there is only one study from Asplund et al. (2005) which "more
directly" tests this assumption, finding evidence in the case of Sweden-Denmark border of a
positive relationship between the distance from the border and the quantity of spirits sold from
the low tax nation (Denmark) to cross-border consumers.
11The standard is the average per-capita tax base of five provinces: Quebec, Ontario, Mani-
toba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia.
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jurisdictions with a negative total entitlement receive no transfer. Therefore the
provinces that receive the transfer are the only ones aﬀected by the equalization
system.
We split the Canadian provinces12 during 1984-1994 into those whose bud-
get constraints were not aﬀected by the equalization formula (Alberta, Ontario,
British Columbia and - only for the period 1984-85 - Saskatchewan) and those
whose budget constraints were aﬀected (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island,
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Manitoba and - only for the period 1986-
94 - Saskatchewan). The former group comprised 35 observations and the latter
group 75 observations.
To isolate the independent impact of neighboring tax rates on the tax rate of
a Canadian province, other variables that might aﬀect the provincial tax rate are
taken into account. First, we control for the US neighboring tax rates. Moreover,
the province’s tax rate on commodities depends on several other types of vari-
able. Provincial taxation may be influenced by the economic and demographic
environment. This is controlled by using the following variables: population,
density, per-capita income, per-capita GDP, unemployment rate, proportion of
population over 65, total expenditure over GDP. Account is taken of the federal
fiscal instruments, which may diﬀer from province to province, by using federal
grants-in-aid in relation to total population and the federal income tax, collected
in each province, normalized with GDP. For the previous variables we computed
the corresponding mean variables of the neighboring Canadian provinces and
neighboring US states to each Canadian province.
The political aﬃliation of the provincial government may also aﬀect the tax-
rate level: we divide the Canadian party system in three main groups: Progressive-
Conservative, which is right wing; Liberal, which is center; and a left wing group
composed of the New Democratic Party, the Parti Québecois and the Social
Credit Party. We then build dummies for the provincial premier’s membership
in each of the three groups and variables accounting for the percentage in the
legislature of the three political groups.
There are certain unchanging characteristics of a province that are likely to
aﬀect its fiscal system, such as climate and geography. We take these character-
istics into account by including a dichotomous variable for each province.
Changes in the macroeconomic situation may aﬀect the fiscal policies of all
provinces. To account for this, we use a dichotomous variable for each year. These
eﬀects are very important in the present context because the years 1984-94 saw
an increasingly severe federal no-smoking policy which led to massive increases in
the tax rate on cigarettes. This was followed by a very large increase in cigarette
exports year by year.
12We excluded the three Territories Nunavut, Nortwest Territories and Yukon because they
represent a very small part of Canada in terms of population, income and tax base.
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6.1 Hypotheses
The theoretical predictions are checked by estimating the following equation:
tst = αs+βt+γ1λhst+γ2 (1− λ)hst+γ3(1−ψ)hst+γ4λ(1−ψ)hst+δ2xst+st (16)
where tst is the tax rate for province s and year t; αs are province-fixed
eﬀects; βt are dummies that capture macro-shocks and common changes in fis-
cal policy; hst is the average tax rate of the neighboring provinces in year t.
Moreover ψ is a dummy for the provinces where tst > hst (51 observations for
cigarettes and 57 for gasoline); λ is a dummy for the provinces where the equal-
izing system operates (75 observations); λ(1−ψ) is a dummy where tst < hst and
equalization holds including 29 observations for cigarettes and 37 for gasoline;
xst is a vector of province-specific time-varying controls; st is the error term.
The vector xst of controls is composed of 23 variables:13 the mean neighbor-
ing US tax rate, EXPEst, INCst and its square, UNEMPst, GDPst, POPst,
AGEDst and DENSst, the neighboring Canadian variables for INCst and its
square, GRANTst, UNEMPst, GDPst, DENSst and symmetric variables for the
neighboring US states, two dummies for the political aﬃliation of the premier.
Equation (16) can be used to check the reaction function slope for four tax-
equalization regimes. First γ1 is the slope of the tax-rate reaction function when
tst > hst and province s receives the equalization transfer (in the cigarette-tax
case 46 observations pick up this regime; in the gasoline case the observations are
38). In Section 4 this corresponds to dt1dt2
¯¯¯
t1>t2
when α > 0. The sum γ1+ γ3+ γ4
gives the slope of the tax-rate reaction function in the case tst < hst and province
s receives the equalization transfer (this case corresponds to 29 observations for
cigarette tax and 37 for gasoline). In Section 4 it is dt1dt2
¯¯¯
t1<t2
when α > 0.Moreover
γ2 is the slope of the tax-rate reaction function in the case tst > hst and province
s does not receive the equalization transfer (the observations in this regime are
13 for cigarette and 10 for gasoline). In the theoretical model γ2 corresponds to
dt1
dt2
¯¯¯
t1>t2
when α = 0. Finally, γ2+γ3 is the slope of the tax-rate reaction function
in the case tst < hst and province s does not receive the equalization transfer (in
this last regime we have 22 observations for cigarettes and 20 for gasoline). In
Section 4 this is dt1dt2
¯¯¯
t1<t2
when α = 0.
Note that a significant and negative γ3 tests Hypothesis 2 when α = 0:"
dt1
dt2
¯¯¯¯
t1>t2
− dt1
dt2
¯¯¯¯
t1<t2
#¯¯¯¯
¯
α=0
> 0,
13All variables are extensively defined in table 1.
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while a negative and significant γ3 + γ4 tests Hypothesis 2 when α > 0:"
dt1
dt2
¯¯¯¯
t1>t2
− dt1
dt2
¯¯¯¯
t1<t2
#¯¯¯¯
¯
α>0
> 0.
Finally, a positive and significant γ4 tests Hypothesis 3:"
dt1
dt2
¯¯¯¯
t1>t2
− dt1
dt2
¯¯¯¯
t1<t2
#¯¯¯¯
¯
α>0
<
"
dt1
dt2
¯¯¯¯
t1>t2
− dt1
dt2
¯¯¯¯
t1<t2
#¯¯¯¯
¯
α=0
,
which means that the diﬀerence in slopes (Hypothesis 2) decreases if the equal-
ization transfer is introduced.
6.2 Estimation Strategy
The theoretical model discussed in Section 3 yields two simultaneous equations:
one from the solution of the optimal tax problem of province 1, which deter-
mines t1, for a given t2 and the other from the symmetric tax problem solved by
province 2, which determines t2, for a given t1. In the empirical specification we
can conceive t1 as the Canadian province tax rate (tst) and t2 as the mean of the
neighboring province tax rates (hst). If not all the neighboring variables are used
but only the mean, we can reduce the empirical situation to a two-province prob-
lem: each province competes with one fictitious (average) neighboring province.
As in all studies of social interaction, this economic framework suﬀers from
an identification problem concerning the model’s structural equations and a si-
multaneity bias in the standard errors of the equation being estimated. These
issues arise because tax-rate interactions are symmetric, in the sense that each
province’s behavior aﬀects that of its neighbors in the same way, while the neigh-
boring provinces behavior aﬀects the province’s own behavior, which feeds back
again on the neighbors.
We tackle these two problems firstly by identifying one of these two equa-
tions, and secondly, by instrumenting the endogenous variables to cope with the
endogeneity bias.
We estimated (16) for the cigarette and gasoline tax rates in Canada. Note
that the four interactions of the mean Canadian neighboring tax rate are endoge-
nous because they may also be influenced by the Canadian province. The mean
neighboring US tax rate (eight out of the ten provinces considered border on the
US) is endogenous: the US rate mean may also be influenced by the Canadian
province. Moreover, the variable EXPEst may be influenced by the tax revenue
on cigarette or gasoline and therefore be endogenous. We thus finally have six
endogenous variables. A simple OLS estimate of (16) would suﬀer from endo-
geneity bias: the error term st would be correlated with the error terms of the
other simultaneous equations of the system. We use the two-stage least squares
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method: first we estimate the reduced forms of the six endogenous variables and
then substitute their fitted values into (16). The residuals of this last equation
are corrected by using the actual values of the endogenous variables.14
6.2.1 Instrumentation
The vector of instruments is composed of 11 variables:15 GRANT, INCTAX,PROG−
CONS,LIBERALS,LEFT and the mean Canadian and US neighboring vari-
ables for POP,AGED and INCTAX. We argue that these variables aﬀect λhst,
(1− λ)hst, (1− ψ)hst, λ(1− ψ)hst, EXPEst and the mean neighboring US tax
rate, but are not correlated with tst. This vector enabled us to identify equation
(16), which has six endogenous variables.
We instrument the mean Canadian neighboring tax rate γ1λhst, γ2 (1− λ)hst,
γ3(1− ψ)hst, γ4λ(1− ψ)hst with the neighboring Canadian variables for POPst,
AGEDst, INCTAXst. The level of taxation, and in a reduced form equation also
the tax rate on cigarettes or gasoline, is in fact normally linked to the size of
population: these variables influence the available tax base and the cost of public
goods. Moreover, age structure influences taxation according to the relative pref-
erence for social policies. It is likely that these neighboring variables do not aﬀect
the province’s tax rate on cigarettes or gasoline. The inclusion of INCTAXst is
explained by the fact that the federal income tax can influence the provincial tax,
and therefore provincial taxes on cigarettes, in a reduced form equation (Besley,
Rosen, 1998). We instrumented the mean US neighboring state tax rate with the
same corresponding variables.
Finally, we instrument EXPEst with GRANTst and INCTAXst . Both vari-
ables are important in determining the tax rate on cigarettes - not directly, but
indirectly through the level of public expenditure. The larger the grant that a
province receives, the higher its public expenditure for a given level of taxation.
The variable INCTAXst is included because the federal income tax may influ-
ence the provincial income tax and therefore total provincial revenue, which of
course is closely correlated with total expenditure. INCTAXst does not work
very well as an instrument for the gasoline-tax regression. We included it in the
explicative covariates of the second stage regression, in fact gasoline tax has a
much larger tax base than cigarette tax and it is likely that each province will
decide its level by also considering the federal fiscal pressure (which in our case
is measured with INCTAXst ) on their citizens: this implies that the structural
equation of gasoline tax may be aﬀected by this variable. Finally, since it is likely
that public expenditure policies diﬀer according to the political majority, we also
14The two-stage least square strategy would produce residuals using the fitted values of the
endogenous variables. Since we are estimating the structural model, we are interested in the
residuals using the actual values of the endogenous variables.
We perform the procedure by using the ivreg command of STATA, which already gives the
corrected residuals with the actual values of the endogenous variables.
15The variables are extensively defined in table 1.
14
included the political variables for the relative strengths of the various groups -
PROG− CONS, LIBERALS and LEFT - as instruments of EXPEst.
6.2.2 Controls
Since GRANTst and INCTAXst can also proxy time-varying provincial shocks
(business cycle), they may give rise to missing variables in the second stage
equation. We control for this in the second stage equation by using UNEMPst,
INCst and its square, and GDPst. The political variables may also influence
the choice of the cigarette tax rate; consequently in the second stage equation
we control for dummies revealing the political aﬃliation of the premier which
are closely related with the political instruments and therefore capture the same
political eﬀect.
We also controlled for POPst, AGEDst and DENSst, the mean Canadian
neighboring and the mean neighboring US corresponding density variable. These
neighboring variables may be important when the provinces evaluate the cross-
border shopping threat and decide the tax rate.
Spatial error dependence may arise when the error includes some omitted vari-
ables not captured in the covariates, which are themselves spatially dependent.
If the spatial dependence is ignored the estimation may be biased (Brueckner,
2001; Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001). We deal with this problem by controlling
for more than one variable, proxying the neighboring economic environment: the
neighboring Canadian variables for INCst and its square, GRANTst,UNEMPst,
GDPst and symmetric variables for the neighboring US provinces. If those vari-
ables are omitted, they may generate a spurious correlation between a province’s
own tax and the neighboring tax or other exogenous covariates.
We finally controlled for year and province eﬀects. Year eﬀects are especially
important in the cigarette case because the strong federal antismoking policy has
led the Canadian government to raise the federal tax on cigarettes year after
year. This may give rise to a vertical externality linking the provincial tax to the
federal tax (Besley, Case, 1998): the year eﬀects control for this link, which may
mimic the neighboring tax link.
After performing the two stage least square regressions we test the validity of
the instrument, regressing the residuals from the second stage equation on the
instruments and all the exogenous variables and running an F-test on the joint
significance of the instruments (Sargan test).
An identical procedure was adopted to instrument the endogenous variables
with more aggregated estimates of the reaction function slopes.
6.3 Results
In Table 2, which refers to cigarette tax, we report the results (col.1) of an
OLS regression of cigarette tax rates on the aggregated mean of the neighboring
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Canadian tax-rates. We obtain a positive but not significant coeﬃcient. When
we instrument and use the two stage least square method (col.2, table 2), the
coeﬃcient becomes significant (t = 2.81) and continues to be positive: if the
average neighboring province increases its tax rate by 1, an average Canadian
province will increase its own tax rate by 0.778. The overidentification test is not
very robust (Prob > F = 0.49). This first test confirms that there is a significant
relationship in Canada between neighboring cigarette taxes, and that the slope
of the reaction function is positive (Hypothesis 1).
We then run (column 3, table 2) a regression where we interact the reaction
function coeﬃcient with a dummy accounting for the tax regimes tst > hst (col. 3
of tab. 2). We find that a province with a higher tax rate than its neighbor does
not react diﬀerently to a neighboring change in tax than if it has a lower rate: the
coeﬃcient is not significant. This means that there is apparently no diﬀerence in
the reaction function slopes between the two tax regimes tst > hst and tst < hst.
In this case too, the overidentification test is not very robust (Prob > F = 0.56),
which may mean that the instruments are not very good, or that the specification
is not correct because some variable correlated with the instruments is missing.16
Our theory suggests why. In fact, if we want to test Hypothesis 2 we must look at
the reaction function slopes in the case when no-equalization holds. We therefore
use the same instruments but enrich the specification by estimating (16). Note
that the diﬀerence in slopes between the tax regime tst < hst and tst > hst,
when the province receives the equalization transfer is γ3+ γ4 = −2.368+ 2.220,
and the same diﬀerence, when the province does not receive the equalization
transfer, is γ3 = −2.368; both coeﬃcients are more than 5% significant: this
is consistent with Hypothesis 2 in Section 5. Finally Hypothesis 3 is confirmed
because γ4 = 2.220 > 0 is significant, which means that the diﬀerence in slope
decreases.17
Table 3 reports the same regressions as table 2 for gasoline tax. Column 2
evidences a significant link between the provincial tax and the mean Canadian
neighboring tax. Interestingly the overidentification test is very good (Prob >
F = 0.96). Recall that in the corresponding regression for the cigarette tax,
it is 0.46. This probably means that the specification is correct: in fact, the
interactions with the dummies (column 4, table 3) are not significant. This re-
16The residuals may include this variable, which if related with the instruments will also be
reflected in the coeﬃcients of the instruments when we regress the residuals on all the covariates
plus the instruments to test the null hypothesis that the instruments are jointly diﬀerent from
0. It follows that the test is weakened by the correlation between the instruments and the
missing variable included in the residuals.
17In the regression of column 4 we drop the regressor AGEDst. If this regressor is left, the
values of the tax variables are almost the same, but the significance of the regressors decreases.
However the coeﬃcient of AGEDst in the specification with the neighboring interactions is not
significant at all (t = 0.01). Nothing changes in the overidentification test (Prob > F = 0.99):
if there had been a missing variable, the biased residuals would probably have been correlated
with two instruments: the corresponding Canadian and US neighboring variables for AGEDst.
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sult is consistent with a linear cross-border shopping function (Kanbur and Keen
1993).18 In this case the shopping technology does not exibit scale economies:
people crossing the border cannot do anything more than fill up. It is not par-
ticularly easy to buy fuel and store it, which is the source of the nonlinearity in
the cross-border shopping cost.
We tried other specifications for the neighboring variables. Specifically, we
used a more constrained neighboring variable like the mean Canadian and US
neighboring tax rate, but this did not yield any tax competition result either for
cigarettes or gasoline. Interestingly, when we used the "Second-Order Neighbors"
(the mean of the neighbors of the neighbors), we obtained no significant tax
competition either in the cigarette or in the gasoline case. This strengthens the
conclusion that the result is not just due to a correlation among tax rates of all
Canadian provinces but is a neighbor’s eﬀect.
7 Conclusions
We have theoretically assessed the eﬀect of an equalization transfer in a model
with tax competition on a mobile good. We have shown that the tax reaction
function diﬀers according to whether a province exports or imports the good. An
exporting province has a more pronounced slope than an importing one. This
result was obtained by assuming a cross-border shopping cost not linear in the
distance from the border. The introduction of the equalization transfer oﬀsets
such nonlinearity in the tax reaction function.
This result was tested by using a data-set on cigarette and gasoline taxes
for Canada and US between 1984 and 1994. The test confirmed the nonlinear-
ity in the cigarette reaction function and showed that the introduction of an
equalization transfer reduces the diﬀerence in tax competition between the two
tax regimes. This is not the case of gasoline: the nonlinearity does not hold
in our test and therefore tax competition is not aﬀected by the introduction of
the equalization transfer, even though this is theoretically supposed to aﬀect the
fiscal externality (Bucovertsky, Smart 2006; Kothenburgen, 2002).
Several extensions of the existing analysis are possible. On theoretical ground
it would be important to work on the welfare analysis to understand when oﬀset-
ting nonlinearities generates a Pareto improvement for the federation. It would
be also interesting to model the stage when the federal government decides how
to allocate the transfers to the local governments. The equilibrium transfers may
be very diﬀerent according to whether the central government is maximizing a
representative federal welfare function or is maximizing its re-election chances. In
the latter case the federal government might use transfers to discriminate between
political allies and adversary administrations as it happens in the US (Larcinese,
18It is easy to show that the equalization system does not aﬀect the reaction function slope
if the cross-border shopping cost is linear.
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Rizzo and Testa, 2006).
On the empirical side, it would be useful to collect data on border densities
and border lengths. It is reasonable to assume that each state fixes its tax rate in
view of the neighboring rates, where population density near the border and the
length of the border are greater. Finally an interesting empirical application to
the Canada-US border would be a further check for yardstick competition: should
an incumbent governor of a US state or Canadian province worry about national
neighbors’ policies, or should it also consider international neighbors? Hence,
international yardstick competition rises the intriguing question of whether na-
tional or international neighbors are more important in determining the behavior
of incumbent politicians.
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8 Data Appendix
tst Canadian cigarette tax rate, for province s in year t, divided by the Canadian
CPI and the Canada-US PPP index; these rates are provided by the Finance de-
partments of the ten considered provinces and are expressed in Canadian dollars
per pack of 20 cigarettes. Canadian gasoline tax rate for province s in year t,
divided by the Canadian CPI and the Canada-US PPP index; these rates are from
http://www.taxpayer.com/studies/federal/GasTaxReport2001.pdf, where they are
expressed in Canadian dollars per lt. of gasoline.
8.1 Endogenous variables
hst is the mean of the tax rates in year t of the Canadian provinces bordering on
province s, divided by the Canadian CPI and the Canada-US PPP index.
Mean of the tax rates of the US states bordering on province s in year t,
divided by the US CPI. The tax rates on cigarettes and gasoline for the United
States are taken from http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/acir.html: cigarette
tax rates are expressed in US dollars per pack of 20 cigarettes and gasoline tax
rates are expressed in US dollars per gallon of gasoline, then transformed in lt.
EXPEst is the total province expenditure divided by the GDP for province
s in year t. Total province expenditure comes from www.statcan.ca.
8.2 Demographic and economic variables
POPst is the number of persons in province s in year t. Figures are taken from
www.statcan.ca for Canada and http://www.census.gov for the United provinces.
DENSst is calculated as the total population (POPst) divided by the area
for province s in year t. Areas are expressed in square miles: for Canada from
http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/Land/Geography/phys01.htm and for the
US from http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html.
AGEDst is the ratio of individuals aged over 65 to the total population of
province s in year t. The number of individuals aged over 65 is obtained from
http://www.statcan.ca for Canada and www.census.gov for the United provinces.
UNEMPst unemployment rate for province s in year t. From http://www.statcan.ca
for Canada and from http://www.stats.bls.gov for the US.
INCst per-capita income for province s in year t divided by the Canadian
CPI and the Canada-US PPP index for Canada and US CPI for United States.
Income figures are obtained from http://www.statcan.ca for Canada and from
http://www.bea.doc.gov for the US.
GRANTst per-capita federal grant-in-aid for province s in year t divided by
the Canadian CPI and the Canada-US PPP index for Canada and US CPI for
United States. Federal grant-in-aid for the US is obtained from “Federal Ex-
penditures by State” which is part of the Consolidated Federal Funds Reports
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program from US Census Bureau and for Canada from http://www.statcan.ca.
GDPst per-capita GDP for province s in year t divided by the Canadian CPI
and the Canada-US PPP index for Canada and US CPI for United States. GDP
is obtained from http://www.statcan.ca for Canada and http://www.bea.doc.gov
for the US.
INCTAXst federal tax revenue over GDP for province s in year t. Fed-
eral tax-revenue figures are from http://www.statcan.ca for Canada and from
www.bea.doc.gov for the US.
PROG−CONSst percentage of the Progressive Conservative in the provincial
legislature. From http://www.swishweb.com/Politics/Canada.
LIBERALst percentage of the Liberal Party in the provincial legislature.
From http://www.swishweb.com/Politics/Canada.
LEFTst percentage of New Democratic, Quebec and Social Credit parties in
the provincial legislature. From http://www.swishweb.com/Politics/Canada.
Also computed are two dichotomous variables to account for the party of the
premier (Progressive Conservative and Liberal).
From http://www.swishweb.com/Politics/Canada.
The PPP (Parity Purchasing Power) index for Canada-US is downloaded from
the OECD web site.
The US CPI (Consumer Price Index) is taken from the Statistical Abstracts
of the United provinces (2000).
The Canadian CPI (Consumer Price Index) is from http://www.statcan.ca.
8.3 The neighboring variables
Computed for all the demographic and economic variables are the neighboring
Canadian and United provinces variables. A neighboring Canadian variable for
province s in year t is computed as the mean of the variable in all the Canadian
provinces neighboring province s in year t. The neighboring Canadian x variable
is defined as: C NEIGH x.
A neighboring United States variable for province s in year t is computed as
the mean of the variable in all the US states neighboring province s in year t.
The neighboring United States x variable is defined as: US NEIGH x.
An example: suppose there are four neighboring provinces (defined as n =
2, 3, 4, 5), then the neighboring Canadian xst variable for province 1 in year t
would be:
C NEIGH x1t =
P
s∈n
xst
4
.
21
9 Appendix
If t1 > t2, dt1dt2 =
1+A(t1−α)
2+A(t1−α) . Using the FOC of (12) which gives t1(t2, α) and taking
the derivative of dt1dt2 with respect to α, we get:
d2t1
dt2dα
=
A
¡dt1
dα − 1
¢
[2 +A (t1 − α)]2
,
using 0 < dt1dα < 1:
19
d2t1
dt2dα
< 0 ∀α ∈
·
0,
1
A
·
. (17)
Note that (17) proves that dt1dt2 is continuous and monotone in α. This means
that if an equalization transfer is introduced ( α > 0) the reaction function slope
is lower than in the no-equalization case.
If t1 < t2, dt1dt2 =
1−A(t1−α)
2−A(t1−α) . Using the FOC of (12) which gives t1(t2, α) and
taking the derivative of dt1dt2 with respect to α, we get:
d2t1
dt2dα
=
−A
¡dt1
dα − 1
¢
[2−A (t1 − α)]2
and using 0 < dt1dα < 1, one obtains:
d2t1
dt2dα
> 0 ∀α ∈
·
0,
1
A
·
. (18)
As before, (18) states that dt1dt2 is continuous and monotone in α. This proves that
if an equalization transfer is introduced (α > 0) the reaction function slope is
higher than in the no-equalization case.
Let us define:
∆ = dt1
dt2
¯¯¯¯
t1<t2
− dt1
dt2
¯¯¯¯
t1>t2
and then use (17) and (18):
d∆
dα
=
dt1
dt2dα
¯¯¯¯
t1<t2
− dt1
dt2dα
¯¯¯¯
t1>t2
> 0 ∀α ∈
·
0,
1
A
·
.
Taking account of continuity and monotonicity, we can establish that if an
equalization transfer holds, the diﬀerence in slope in a point (t1, t2) belonging
to the reaction function in the tax-regime t1 < t2 and any other point (t1, t2)
belonging to the reaction function in the tax-regime t1 > t2 decreases in absolute
value with respect to the no-equalization case.
The symmetric case is ruled out because, given that γ1 6= γ2, it will never be
an equilibrium.
19This can be shown, by totally diﬀerentiating with respect to t1 and α, the FOC and using
Assumptions 1-3.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
CTAX (province unit cigarette tax, 1989 US$) 110 0.81 0.30 0.22 1.53
C NEIGH CTAX (neighboring Canadian province average unit cigarette tax, 1989 
US$)
110 0.78 0.24 0.21 1.35
US NEIGH CTAX (neighboring US state unit cigarette tax,1989 US$) 110 0.21 0.12 0 0.39
GTAX (province unit gasoline tax, 1989 US$) 110 0.72 0.28 0 1.19
C NEIGH GTAX (neighboring Canadian province average unit gasoline tax, 1989 
US$)
110 0.72 0.27 0 1.19
US NEIGH GTAX (neighboring US state unit gasoline tax,1989 US$) 110 0.35 0.18 0 0.59
EXPE (total province public expenditure divided by provincial gdp) 110 0.62 0.15 0.34 0.94
PROG-CONS (% of progressives-conservatives in the provincial legislature) 110 0.32 0.30 0 0.95
LIBERALS (% of liberals in the provincial legislature) 110 0.38 0.33 0 1
NDP (%of national democrats, quebec party and socialist party in the provincial 
legislature)
110 0.27 0.31 0 1
POP*10-7 (province population) 110 0.27 0.31 0.01 1.08
DENS*103 (population density: population divided by area) 110 12.79 11.29 2.49 38.20
UNEMP (unemployment rate) 110 11.49 3.72 5 21
AGED (proportion of population over 65) 110 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.14
INC*103 (province income per capita in 1989 US$) 110 13.22 1.99 9.49 17
GRANT*103 (federal grants divided by provincial population) 110 1.07 0.46 0.42 1.98
INCTAX*103 (federal income tax divided by provincial gdp) 110 82.5 13.13 53.79 11.12
GDP*10-3 (provincial gross domestic product per-capita in 1989 US million $) 110 13.85 3.09 9.36 25.07
C NEIGH DENS*103 (neighboring Canadian province average population density) 110 12.51 8.21 3.98 27.48
US NEIGH DENS*103 (neighboring US state average population density) 110 52.92 71.42 0 230.03
C NEIGH UNEMP (neighboring Canadian province average unemployment rate)
110 10.93 2.45 6.25 15.5
US NEIGH UNEMP (neighboring US state average unemployment rate) 110 4.82 2.67 0 8.64
C NEIGH INC*103 (neighboring Canadian province average population per-capita 
income in 1989 US$)
110 13.41 1.39 10.08 15.90
US NEIGH INC*103 (neighboring US state average  per-capita income  in 1989 
US$)
110 12.72 6.55 0 19.24
C NEIGH GRANT*103 (neighboring Canadian province average federal grant on 
provincial gdp)
110 1.01 0.32 0.52 1.70
US NEIGH GRANT*103 (neighboring US state average  federal grant on state gdp) 110 0.54 0.29 0 0.9
C NEIGH INCTAX*103 (neighboring US state average federal income tax on state 
gdp)
110 80.63 10.37 53.78 100.84
US NEIGH INCTAX*103 (neighboring Canadian province average federal income 
tax on provincial gdp)
110 70.97 36.12 0 104.40
C NEIGH GDP*103 (neighboring Canadian province average gdp per-capita in 
1989 US million $)
110 14.28 2.84 10.16 25.07
US NEIGH GDP*103 (neighboring US state average gdp per-capita in 1989 US 
million $)
110 14.56 7.51 0 22.28
US NEIGH POP*10-7 (neighboring US state average population) 110 0.25 0.32 0 1.11
C NEIGH POP*10-7 (neighboring Canadian province average population) 110 0.31 0.19 0.42 0.72
C NEIGH AGED (neighboring US state average proportion of population over 65)
110 0.10 0.05 0 0.14
US NEIGH AGED (neighboring Canadian province average proportion of 
population over 65)
110 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.13
Notes: Figures are means, with standard deviations in parenthesis, based on annual data for the years 1984-1994, inclusive, for the
following ten Canadian provinces: Alberta, Ontario, British Columbia Saskatchewan, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova
Scotia, New Brusnweek, Quebec, Manitoba.
Table 2: Tax competition on cigarette tax rate
Dependent variable: province cigarette tax rate (specific unit tax), 1984-1994
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable CTAX CTAX CTAX CTAX
0.470 0.778 0.780
(1.76) (2.81)* (2.50)*
0.814
(1.85)
3.370
(2.62)*
-2.368
(2.17)*
2.220
(2.16)*
0.069
(0.33)
overidentification test (Sargan) 0.49 0.56 0.99
 Prob > F on exogenous variables (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005
  Prob > F on neighboring exogenous variables 
(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009
  Prob > F on the year effects (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004
Prob > F on the province effects (p-value) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 0.0377
Constant YES YES YES YES
Province fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 110 110 110 110
R-squared 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.76
Adjusted R-squared 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.58
C NEIGH CTAX
Interaction with C NEIGH CTAX of a dummy=1
when there is equalization
Interaction with C NEIGH CTAX of a dummy=1
when there is no equalization
Interaction with C NEIGH CTAX of a dummy=1
when CTAX lower  than C NEIGH CTAX  
Interaction with C NEIGH CTAX of a dummy=1
when CTAX lower than C NEIGH CTAX &
equalization
Interaction with C NEIGH TAX of a dummy=1 
when TAX higher than C NEIGH TAX  
OLS regressions; Robust t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%).
Notes: Column (1) presents OLS estimates for the cigarette-tax equation with an aggregated tax-competition
coefficient. Column (2) presents two stages least squares estimates of the same equation. Column (3) presents two
stages least squares estimates, according to the tax regime the province belongs to. Column (4) gives two stages least
squares estimate of equation (16), with interactions accounting for different tax regimes and equalization status.
Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics (with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by province). Variables are
defined in table 1  and described in detail in the data appendix.
Table 3: Tax competition on gasoline tax rate
Dependent variable: province gasoline tax rate (specific unit tax), 1984-1994
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable GTAX GTAX GTAX GTAX
0.316 0.534 0.592
(4.50)** (2.11)* (1.90)
0.410
(0.49)
0.571
(1.31)
0.571
(1.00)
-0.251
(0.54)
-0.175
(0.36)
overidentification test (Sargan) 0.96 0.96 0.99
 Prob > F on exogenous variables (p-value) 0.0014 0.0000 0.0000 0.1356
  Prob > F on neighboring exogenous variables 
(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0055
 Prob > F on  year effets (p-value) 0.0639 0.035 0.2098 0.0093
Prob > F on  province effects (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000
Constant YES YES YES YES
Province fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 110 110 110 110
R-squared 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.91
Adjusted R-squared 0.93 0.87 0.88 0.84
 C NEIGH GTAX 
 Interaction with C NEIGH TAX of a dummy=1 
when GTAX higher than C NEIGH GTAX   
OLS regressions; Robust t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%).
Notes: Column (1) presents OLS estimates for the gasoline-tax equation with an aggregated tax-competition
coefficient. Column (2) presents two stages least squares estimates of the same equation. Column (3) presents two
stages least squares estimates, according to the tax regime the province belongs to. Column (4) gives two stages
least squares estimate of equation (16), with interactions accounting for different tax regimes and equalization
status. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics (with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by province).
Variables are defined in table 1  and described in detail in the data appendix.
  
 Interaction with C NEIGH GTAX of a dummy=1 
when there is equalization 
 Interaction with C NEIGH GTAX of a dummy=1 
when there is no equalization 
 Interaction with C NEIGH GTAX of a dummy=1 
when GTAX lower  than C NEIGH GTAX   
 Interaction with C NEIGH GTAX of a dummy=1 
when GTAX lower  than C NEIGH GTAX  & 
equalization 
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FIG.1 The reaction function, is continuous and convex when t1> t2 and concave when t1<t2. (the proof is available 
upon request). The slope is always positive. When an equalization transfer is introduced the reaction function 
crosses the 45o line at the point (t=s+ , t=s+). (s, s) is the point where the reaction  function crosses the 45o line 
before the introduction of the transfer. the slope of the reaction function, when  t1> t2  is always higher than when 
t1<t2; finally when the equalization transfer is introduced ( >0) the slope of the reaction function, decreases 
when t1> t2  and  decreases when t1< t2. 
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